The Situated Experience of a Common World and Shared Responsibility

Abstract

This study examines the concept of the common through a dialogue between the philosophical thought of Marina Garcés and the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, aiming to understand its ethical and political relevance within a contemporary context marked by multiple social, economic, health, and democratic crises. Rather than conceiving the common as a homogeneous identity, a closed sense of belonging, or an abstract normative ideal, it is presented as a situated, relational, and embodied experience emerging from human interdependence. Drawing on a theoretical review of authors such as Garcés, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Honneth, and Franco, the paper argues that subjectivity cannot be understood as an autonomous reality but as a construction constituted through relationships with others and with a shared world. The analysis highlights Garcés’s notion of a “common world,” understood as a condition of shared vulnerability and responsibility that requires abandoning modern aspirations of domination and control. It also explores the tensions present in contemporary struggles for recognition, particularly regarding race, gender, and difference, revealing the risks of transforming the common into a new form of homogenization or identity-based hierarchy. Furthermore, the study reflects on the possibilities and limitations of concepts such as Sumak Kawsay or Buen Vivir within Latin American contexts, emphasizing the need to situate communal practices within their specific historical and cultural processes. Finally, it argues that the common should be understood as an ethical and political practice grounded in care, reciprocity, justice, and hospitality, capable of sustaining shared life amid conflict and plurality. Rather than an ideal to be achieved, the common emerges as an ongoing task of collective construction and mutual responsibility.